Integrating Game Theory and Data Mining for Dynamic Distribution of Police to Combat Crime

被引:2
作者
Segovia Riquelme, Carolina [1 ]
Smith-Miles, Kate [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chile, Dept Ingn Ind, Santiago, Chile
[2] Univ Melbourne, Sch Math & Stat, Parkville, Vic 3052, Australia
来源
2018 IEEE/WIC/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB INTELLIGENCE (WI 2018) | 2018年
关键词
Security; crime prediction; game theory; optimization; data mining;
D O I
10.1109/WI.2018.00016
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a framework that provides a strategy for police to allocate resources to tackle crime, by integrating data mining models for dynamic crime prediction with a game theoretical approach to recognize the adversarial nature of the problem. The proposed framework is applied to a real case study from Santiago (Chile), and compared to other strategies involving game theory or data milling alone. The hybrid approach is demonstrated to lead to improved payoffs for the police and reduced payoffs for the criminals. A robustness analysis explores how accuracy of the data mining models affects the outcomes of the game, showing that the proposed approach can absorb significant forecasting errors while still producing superior outcomes for the police.
引用
收藏
页码:780 / 783
页数:4
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