Teacher Incentives

被引：192
|
作者：
Glewwe, Paul [1 ]
Ilias, Nauman [2 ]
Kremer, Michael [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Minnesota, Dept Appl Econ, St Paul, MN 55108 USA
[2] Compass Lexecon, Washington, DC 20005 USA
[3] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Littauer Ctr M20, Brookings Inst,Ctr Global Dev, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 2卷 / 03期
关键词：
ACHIEVEMENT; ACCOUNTABILITY; PERFORMANCE; COLOMBIA; VOUCHERS;
D O I：
10.1257/app.2.3.205
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze a randomized trial of a program that rewarded Kenyan primary school teachers based on student test scores, with penalties for students not taking the exams. Scores increased on the formula used to reward teachers, and program school students scored higher on the exams linked to teacher incentives. Yet most of the gains were focused on the teacher reward formula. The dropout rate was unchanged. Instead, exam participation increased among enrolled students. Test scores increased on exams linked to the incentives, but not on other, unrelated exams. Teacher attendance and homework assignment were unaffected, but test preparation sessions increased. (JEL I21, I28, J13, O15)
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页码：205 / 227
页数：23
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