Optimal Forager against Ideal Free Distributed Prey

被引:13
作者
Garay, Jozsef [1 ,2 ]
Cressman, Ross [3 ]
Xu, Fei [3 ]
Varga, Zoltan [4 ]
Cabello, Tomas [5 ]
机构
[1] Eotvos Univ MTA ELTE, Hungarian Acad Sci, Theoret Biol & Evolutionary Ecol Res Grp, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary
[2] Eotvos Lorand Univ, Dept Plant Systemat Ecol & Theoret Biol, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary
[3] Wilfrid Laurier Univ, Dept Math, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada
[4] Szent Istvan Univ, Inst Math & Informat, H-2103 Godollo, Hungary
[5] Almeria Univ, Ctr Agribusiness Biotechnol Res, ES-04120 Almeria, Spain
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
dispersal-foraging game; game dynamics; ideal free distribution; optimal foraging; BEHAVIORAL DYNAMICS; POPULATION-DYNAMICS; PATCH USE; PREDATOR; DISPERSAL; CHOICE; GAME; STRATEGY; MITES;
D O I
10.1086/681638
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
The introduced dispersal-foraging game is a combination of prey habitat selection between two patch types and optimal-foraging approaches. Prey's patch preference and forager behavior determine the prey's survival rate. The forager's energy gain depends on local prey density in both types of exhaustible patches and on leaving time. We introduce two game-solution concepts. The static solution combines the ideal free distribution of the prey with optimal-foraging theory. The dynamical solution is given by a game dynamics describing the behavioral changes of prey and forager. We show (1) that each stable equilibrium dynamical solution is always a static solution, but not conversely; (2) that at an equilibrium dynamical solution, the forager can stabilize prey mixed patch use strategy in cases where ideal free distribution theory predicts that prey will use only one patch type; and (3) that when the equilibrium dynamical solution is unstable at fixed prey density, stable behavior cycles occur where neither forager nor prey keep a fixed behavior.
引用
收藏
页码:111 / 122
页数:12
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