FIFTY SHADES OF DECEPTION: CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF LYING IN NEGOTIATIONS

被引:22
作者
Gaspar, Joseph P. [1 ]
Methasani, Redona [2 ]
Schweitzer, Maurice [3 ]
机构
[1] Quinnipiac Univ, Sch Business, Management, Hamden, CT 06518 USA
[2] Univ Connecticut, Sch Business, Storrs, CT USA
[3] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Operat Informat & Decis, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
UNETHICAL BARGAINING TACTICS; POSITIVE AFFECT; ANGER; MODEL; SELF; MISREPRESENTATION; LIES; INCENTIVES; BEHAVIOR; EMOTION;
D O I
10.5465/amp.2017.0047
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Deception pervades our social interactions and can profoundly shape our relational and economic outcomes. This is particularly true in negotiations. We review the extant literature investigating deception in negotiation, challenge prevailing assumptions in this literature, and call for future work to fill fundamental gaps in our understanding of how deception influences intrapersonal, interpersonal, and economic outcomes. Specifically, we challenge empirical and theoretical investigations that have conceptualized deception as an unethical, dichotomous construct (e.g., honest or deceptive) and have studied deception as informational, lies of commission in single-shot experiments with unfamiliar counterparts. We highlight the importance of characterizing deception as a multidimensional construct, and we focus on three dimensions of deception: intentionality (self-interested or prosocial), content (informational or emotional), and activity (omission, commission, or paltering). We introduce the Deception Consequence Model (DCM) to offer a framework and foundation for future research.
引用
收藏
页码:62 / 81
页数:20
相关论文
共 122 条
[11]   The Roles of Dehumanization and Moral Outrage in Retributive Justice [J].
Bastian, Brock ;
Denson, Thomas F. ;
Haslam, Nick .
PLOS ONE, 2013, 8 (04)
[12]  
Boero Riccardo., 2009, The Journal of Socio-Economics, V38, P871, DOI [DOI 10.1016/J.SOCEC.2009.05.004, 10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.004]
[13]  
Bok Sissela., 2011, LYING MORAL CHOICE P
[14]   Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining [J].
Boles, TL ;
Croson, RTA ;
Murnighan, JK .
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, 2000, 83 (02) :235-259
[15]   Accuracy of deception judgments [J].
Bond, Charles F., Jr. ;
DePaulo, Bella M. .
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW, 2006, 10 (03) :214-234
[16]   Truth or consequences: An experiment [J].
Brandts, J ;
Charness, G .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2003, 49 (01) :116-130
[17]   Can Nervous Nelly negotiate? How anxiety causes negotiators to make low first offers, exit early, and earn less profit [J].
Brooks, Alison Wood ;
Schweitzer, Maurice E. .
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, 2011, 115 (01) :43-54
[18]   DECISIONS BASED ON NUMERICALLY AND VERBALLY EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTIES [J].
BUDESCU, DV ;
WEINBERG, S ;
WALLSTEN, TS .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-HUMAN PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE, 1988, 14 (02) :281-294
[19]   Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game [J].
Burnham, T ;
McCabe, K ;
Smith, VL .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2000, 43 (01) :57-73
[20]  
Camerer C., 2004, Foundations of human sociality: economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, P55