Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions

被引:12
作者
Bazzi, Samuel [1 ,2 ]
Hanson, Gordon [2 ,3 ]
John, Sarah [4 ]
Roberts, Bryan [4 ]
Whitley, John [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Harvard Kennedy Sch, Cambridge, MA USA
[4] Inst Def Anal, Alexandria, VA USA
关键词
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT; SELF-SELECTION; US BORDER; MIGRATION;
D O I
10.1257/pol.20190291
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
During the 2008 to 2012 period, the US Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include fingerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later reapprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the rollout of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month reapprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2 percent. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.
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页码:1 / 27
页数:27
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