We examine the prevalence of gradualist strategies and their effect on trust-building and economic gains in a setting with an infinite horizon, asymmetric information regarding the trustworthiness of receivers, and various levels of trust. The theoretical literature suggests that gradualist strategies mitigate asymmetric information problems and foster trust-building. However, we theoretically and experimentally show that gradualism sometimes reduces joint payoffs relative to a simple "binary" setting in which trust is an all-or-nothing decision. In a series of experiments, we vary the degree of asymmetric information as well as the economic returns to trusting behavior, and delineate circumstances under which gradualism may promote or curb efficiency. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
机构:
Univ Jaume 1, Dept Business Adm & Mkt, AERT Res Grp, CSIC Associate Unit, Castellon de La Plana 12080, SpainUniv Jaume 1, Dept Business Adm & Mkt, AERT Res Grp, CSIC Associate Unit, Castellon de La Plana 12080, Spain
Xavier Molina-Morales, F.
Teresa Martinez-Fernandez, M.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Jaume 1, Dept Business Adm & Mkt, AERT Res Grp, CSIC Associate Unit, Castellon de La Plana 12080, SpainUniv Jaume 1, Dept Business Adm & Mkt, AERT Res Grp, CSIC Associate Unit, Castellon de La Plana 12080, Spain
Teresa Martinez-Fernandez, M.
Torlo, Vanina Jasmine
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Cass Business Sch, Dept Management, London EC1Y 8TZ, EnglandUniv Jaume 1, Dept Business Adm & Mkt, AERT Res Grp, CSIC Associate Unit, Castellon de La Plana 12080, Spain