Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism

被引:2
|
作者
Kartal, Melis [1 ,2 ]
Mueller, Wieland [2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ]
Tremewan, James [6 ]
机构
[1] Vienna Univ Econ & Business, Vienna, Austria
[2] VCEE, Vienna, Austria
[3] Univ Vienna, Vienna, Austria
[4] Tilburg Univ, CentER, Tilburg, Netherlands
[5] TILEC, Tilburg, Netherlands
[6] Univ Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
关键词
Cooperation; Trust; Infinitely repeated games; Gradualism; Game theory; Experiments; REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; STARTING SMALL; RATIONAL COOPERATION; REPUTATION; SHADOW; STRATEGIES; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the prevalence of gradualist strategies and their effect on trust-building and economic gains in a setting with an infinite horizon, asymmetric information regarding the trustworthiness of receivers, and various levels of trust. The theoretical literature suggests that gradualist strategies mitigate asymmetric information problems and foster trust-building. However, we theoretically and experimentally show that gradualism sometimes reduces joint payoffs relative to a simple "binary" setting in which trust is an all-or-nothing decision. In a series of experiments, we vary the degree of asymmetric information as well as the economic returns to trusting behavior, and delineate circumstances under which gradualism may promote or curb efficiency. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:258 / 275
页数:18
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