Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 coordination games

被引：12

作者：

Zhang, Boyu ^{[1
]}

Hofbauer, Josef ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Beijing Normal Univ, Sch Math Sci, Minist Educ, Lab Math & Complex Syst, Beijing 100875, Peoples R China

[2] Univ Vienna, Dept Math, Oskar Morgenstern Pl 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2016年 / 97卷

基金：

中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助;

关键词：

Quantal response equilibrium; Equilibrium selection; Logit equilibrium; Logarithmic game; Punishment; STATISTICAL-MECHANICS; ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The notion of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), has been widely used to explain experimental data. In this paper, we use quantal response equilibrium as a 'homotopy method for equilibrium selection, and study this in detail for 2 x 2 bimatrix coordination games. We show that the risk dominant equilibrium need not be selected. In the logarithmic game, the limiting QRE is the Nash equilibrium with the larger sum of square root payoffs. Finally, we apply the quantal response methods to the mini public goods game with punishment. A cooperative equilibrium can be selected if punishment is strong enough. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：19 / 31

页数：13