Central bank transparency;
Uncertainty;
Disagreement;
Monetary policy;
MONETARY-POLICY;
INFLATION-EXPECTATIONS;
FORECAST DISAGREEMENT;
PANEL-DATA;
COMMUNICATION;
INDEPENDENCE;
INFORMATION;
GUIDANCE;
MARKETS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.10.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using survey data from 25 economies we provide evidence that greater transparency surrounding monetary policy reduces uncertainty of interest rates and inflation, primarily by reducing uncertainty that is common to agents rather than disagreement between agents. This suggests that studies that focus on disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty understate the benefits of monetary policy transparency. The adoption of inflation targets and forward guidance are both associated with lower uncertainty, although inflation targets have a stronger impact on reducing uncertainty than forward guidance. Moreover, there are diminishing benefits from ever higher levels of transparency. Taken as a whole, our results support the contention that clarity of communication is as important as the magnitude of transparency. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机构:
Nederlandsche Bank, NL-1000 AB Amsterdam, NetherlandsNederlandsche Bank, NL-1000 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands
van der Cruijsen, Carin A. B.
Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Tilburg Univ, European Banking Ctr, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
RSM Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam, NetherlandsNederlandsche Bank, NL-1000 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands
Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.
Hoogduin, Lex H.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Nederlandsche Bank, NL-1000 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands
Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NetherlandsNederlandsche Bank, NL-1000 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands