Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?

被引:45
作者
Buon, Marine [1 ]
Seara-Cardoso, Ana [1 ,2 ]
Viding, Essi [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Div Psychol & Language Sci, London, England
[2] Univ Minho, Neuropsychopysiol Lab, CIPsi, Braga, Portugal
[3] UCL, Inst Cognit Neurosci, London, England
关键词
Morality; Dual processes model; Empathy; Theory of mind; Inhibitory control; Intention; Causation; VENTROMEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX; DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS; PREVERBAL INFANTS; ASPERGER-SYNDROME; SOCIAL COGNITION; DECISION-MAKING; NEURAL EVIDENCE; YOUNG-CHILDREN;
D O I
10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5
中图分类号
B841 [心理学研究方法];
学科分类号
040201 ;
摘要
Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.
引用
收藏
页码:1660 / 1680
页数:21
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