In an example of hold-up, giving the investing party the ability to destroy his relationship-specific investment can accommodate equilibria without under-investment. It suggests that destruction can be a possible incentive device in enhancing efficiency in bilateral relationships with hold-up. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ New S Wales, Australian Sch Business, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, AustraliaUniv New S Wales, Australian Sch Business, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
Morita, H.
Servatka, M.
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机构:
Univ New S Wales, Australian Sch Business, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, AustraliaUniv New S Wales, Australian Sch Business, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
Servatka, M.
19TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MODELLING AND SIMULATION (MODSIM2011),
2011,
: 1306
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