The "Two Worlds' Theory in the Phaedo

被引：5

作者：

Fine, Gail ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Cornell Univ, Sage Sch Philosophy, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA

[2] Univ Oxford, Merton Coll, Oxford, England

来源：

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY | 2016年 / 24卷 / 04期

关键词：

Plato; Phaedo; forms; knowledge;

D O I：

10.1080/09608788.2016.1176892

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

At least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory (TW), according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at all, we can have it only when discarnate.

引用

页码：557 / 572

页数：16

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