Prices vs. quantities in a dynamic problem: Externalities from resource extraction

被引:0
|
作者
Briggs, R. J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Energy & Mineral Engn, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
关键词
Environmental policy; Resource policy; Choice of instruments; Asymmetric information; Non-renewable resources; Prices vs. quantities; Taxes; Permits; Uncertainty; STOCK EXTERNALITIES; QUOTAS;
D O I
10.1016/j.reseneeco.2011.06.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows how a stationary tax policy can optimally address a flow externality associated with resource extraction when the policymaker faces asymmetric information. In the model I consider, the policymaker must set policy in each period before the realization of a price shock. Resource owners then learn the value of the shock, and the owners choose extraction quantities. The optimal policy is a stationary tax rule that responds to a positive shock to the current price by reducing next period's tax rate. Intuitively, a reduction in next period's tax rate makes extraction next period less expensive and thus dampens the resource owner's current response to a price increase. This policy is robust to some, but not necessarily all, boundary solutions. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:843 / 854
页数:12
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