Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

被引：53

作者：

Fey, Mark ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Polit Sci, Rochester, NY 14618 USA

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2008年 / 135卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

rent-seeking; contests; conflict; private information; equilibrium existence;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-007-9255-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider rent-seeking contests with two players who each have private information about their own cost of effort. We consider both discrete and continuous distributions of costs and give results for each case, focusing on existence of equilibrium.

引用

页码：225 / 236

页数：12

共 23 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2001, EFFICIENT RENT SEEKI

[2] A theory of legal presumptions [J].

Bernardo, AE ;

Talley, E ;

Welch, I .

JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 2000, 16 (01) :1-49

[3] Contest success functions: an extension [J].

Clark, DJ ;

Riis, C .

ECONOMIC THEORY, 1998, 11 (01) :201-204

[4]

Corchon L., 2007, Review of Economic Design, V11, P69, DOI DOI 10.1007/S10058-007-0032-5

[5] Asymmetric contests with general technologies [J].

Cornes, R ;

Hartley, R .

ECONOMIC THEORY, 2005, 26 (04) :923-946

[6]

Gradstein M., 1995, ECON POLIT-OXFORD, V7, P79, DOI DOI 10.1111/J.1468-0343.1995.TB00105.X

[7] PRIVATELY INFORMED SEEKERS OF AN UNCERTAIN RENT [J].

HARSTAD, RM .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1995, 83 (1-2) :81-93

[8] EFFICIENT RENTS .2. FREE ENTRY AND EFFICIENT RENT SEEKING [J].

HIGGINS, RS ;

SHUGHART, WF ;

TOLLISON, RD .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1985, 46 (03) :247-258

[9]

Hillman A.L., 1989, Economics Politics, V1, P17, DOI DOI 10.1111/J.1468-0343.1989.TB00003.X

[10] RISK-AVERSE RENT SEEKERS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY POWER [J].

HILLMAN, AL ;

KATZ, E .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1984, 94 (373) :104-110

← 1 2 3 →