Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

被引：8
|
作者：
Bonanno, Giacomo [1 ]
Tsakas, Elias [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ AE1, POB 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2018年 / 112卷
关键词：
Ordinal payoffs; Rationality; Common belief; Dominance; Iterated deletion procedure; RATIONALIZABILITY; PROBABILITY; LOGIC;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：231 / 241
页数：11
相关论文
共 24 条
  • [1] On group structures of strategic-form games
    Cao, Zhigang
    Li, Guopeng
    Tan, Zhibin
    Yang, Xiaoguang
    FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH, 2024, 4 (03): : 540 - 549
  • [2] Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games
    Balthasar, Anne
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2010, 42 (01) : 39 - 54
  • [3] Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games
    Anne Balthasar
    Economic Theory, 2010, 42 : 39 - 54
  • [4] Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games
    Hosni, Hykel
    Marchioni, Enrico
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPROXIMATE REASONING, 2019, 114 : 204 - 225
  • [5] Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games
    Bayer, R. -C.
    Renou, Ludovic
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 2016, 56 : 39 - 59
  • [6] ON THE UNIQUENESS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN STRATEGIC-FORM GAMES
    Minagawa, Junichi
    JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES, 2020, 7 (02): : 97 - 104
  • [7] Common belief in rationality in psychological games Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
    Jagau, Stephan
    Perea, Andres
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 100
  • [8] Common Belief in Rationality in Psychological Games
    Jagau, Stephan
    Perea, Andres
    ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2017, (251): : 352 - 352
  • [9] Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness?
    Perea, Andres
    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2022, 119 : 11 - 30
  • [10] Nash and Bayes–Nash equilibria in strategic-form games with intransitivities
    Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
    Richard P. McLean
    Economic Theory, 2019, 68 : 935 - 965
123