Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

被引：9

作者：

Bonanno, Giacomo ^{[1
]}

Tsakas, Elias ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA

[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ AE1, POB 616, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2018年 / 112卷

关键词：

Ordinal payoffs; Rationality; Common belief; Dominance; Iterated deletion procedure; RATIONALIZABILITY; PROBABILITY; LOGIC;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：231 / 241

页数：11

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