Grain futures contracts that permit physical delivery do so through an exchange of delivery instruments. Because delivery instruments can be held indefinitely, extant research shows that futures contracts that assign inflexible and low storage rates relative to the market price of storage facilitate basis nonconvergence. In response to the notable episode of nonconvergence in the mid-to late-2000s, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group introduced variable storage rate (VSR) policies in the soft red winter (SRW) wheat and hard red winter (HRW) wheat markets. In contrast, CME Group did not introduce a VSR to corn and soybean markets but chose to in-crease their fixed storage fees in 2008 and later in 2020. We study convergence performance for each of these markets from 2006 to 2020 and show that flexible storage fee policies like the VSR reduce the magnitude and therefore, the expected duration of nonconvergence in wheat markets. On the other hand, we do not find evi-dence that CME Group's higher fixed storage rates likewise reduce the expected duration of nonconvergence episodes in corn and soybean markets-although perhaps not enough time has passed to evaluate the effec-tiveness of the most recent changes-or that index trader activity causes basis nonconvergence. Our empirical investigation also makes an implicit case for the introduction of market-based pricing platforms, such as com-modity exchanges, in commodity-dependent developing countries.