Changing corporate governance norms: Evidence from dual class shares in the UK

被引:6
|
作者
Braggion, Fabio [1 ]
Giannetti, Mariassunta [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Warandelaan 2, NL-5037 AB Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Stockholm Sch Econ, CEPR, POB 6507,Sveavagen 65, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
[3] ECGI, POB 6507,Sveavagen 65, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Corporate governance; Dual class shares; Investor demand; Public debate; MARKET VALUE; VOTING-RIGHTS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; DIVIDEND POLICIES; STOCK-EXCHANGE; INVESTMENT; MEDIA; DEBT; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2017.05.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In the UK, between 1955 and 1970, dual class shares quickly lost popularity without any regulatory intervention. The decline in the use of dual class shares was positively correlated with the relative valuations of one-share-one-vote and dual class firms, which in turn was related to media pessimism on the use of dual class shares. Following periods with high relative valuations of one-share-one-vote, one-share-one-vote firms exhibited lower returns than dual class firms suggesting that the latter were undervalued. These and other results suggest that investor demand may lead firms to abandon dual class shares. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:15 / 27
页数:13
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