Freedom of association in historical perspective

This paper seeks to examine two conflicting strands in the United States Supreme Court's treatment of freedom of association, by exploring some aspects of the historical development of the doctrine. It suggests that there are two conceptions of freedom of association, an older, traditional one, that eschews forcing odious contact on members of associations, and a newer one which privileges antidiscrimination doctrines over freedom from association. These two conceptions still exist on the Court, resulting in irreconcilable decisions such as those permitting the Boy Scouts to exclude gay scoutmasters, but forcing the Jaycees to accept women. The preference of one conception over the other is also evident in the work of different scholars, whose doctrinal approaches are similarly irreconcilable. The Supreme Court has explained the discontinuities in the doctrine by seeking to characterize it in terms of the First Amendment's freedom of speech clause, but the paper argues that it makes more sense, in the context of these two cases, to regard them as related to the First Amendment's freedom of religion clauses. © 2008 Copyright Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2008.