What's NOT wrong with foundationalism

被引：11

作者：

Bergmann, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Purdue Univ, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH | 2004年 / 68卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00331.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publication, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail.

引用

页码：161 / 165

页数：5