A Reverse Auction Based Efficient D2D Transmission Mechanism for Ubiquitous Power Terminals

被引:0
|
作者
Wei, Xingshen [1 ]
Cao, Yongjian [1 ]
Gao, Peng [1 ]
Xu, Junxian [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing NARI Informat & Commun Technol Co Ltd, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] State Grid Hebei Elect Power Co Ltd, Informat & Commun Branch, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, Peoples R China
来源
UBIQUITOUS SECURITY | 2022年 / 1557卷
关键词
Incentive mechanism; Reverse auction; D2D transmission;
D O I
10.1007/978-981-19-0468-4_24
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Cooperative download and broadcast among mobile devices over the hybrid base-station-to-device (B2D) and device-to-device (D2D) network has been proved to be an effective and efficient approach for video sharing among ubiquitous power terminals. However, incentive problem is arisen such that why would a mobile device be willing to broadcast video data to others at the cost of its own resources, e.g. bandwidth and energy. To address the incentive problem in wireless streaming, we propose a truthful sealed-bid reverse auction model in living streaming scenario where a group of users have synchronous playback offset. A logical central controller acts as the auctioneer, and streaming users act as bidders who download video data through cellular links and bid to sell the service of video data broadcast over the D2D links. Considering economic robust, we derive the relationship between the payment rule and the allocation rule in a truthful auction which guarantees each user to announce the state of resources truthfully. Based on these principles, we design a truthful auction mechanism which not only guarantees the smooth playing of individual user, but also minimizes the payment cost of the auctioneer. Finally, we demonstrate the effective and the economic robustness of our auction mechanism through extensive simulations.
引用
收藏
页码:322 / 335
页数:14
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