Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence

被引：22
|
作者：
Leibbrandt, Andreas [1 ]
Ramalingam, Abhijit [2 ,3 ]
Saeaeksvuori, Lauri [4 ]
Walker, James M. [5 ]
机构：
[1] Monash Univ, Dept Econ, Clayton, Vic 3800, Australia
[2] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich, Norfolk, England
[3] Univ E Anglia, Ctr Behav & Expt Social Sci, Norwich, Norfolk, England
[4] Univ Hamburg, Dept Econ, Hamburg, Germany
[5] Indiana Univ, Dept Econ & Workshop Polit Theory & Policy Anal, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
来源：
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 18卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Public goods experiment; Punishment; Cooperation; Networks; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENTS; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; COOPERATION; PROVISION; REWARDS; ENFORCEMENT; SANCTIONS;
D O I：
10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment.
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页码：15 / 37
页数：23
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