CEO overconfidence and the value of corporate cash holdings

被引：99

作者：

Aktas, Nihat ^{[1
]}

Louca, Christodoulos ^{[2
]}

Petmezas, Dimitris ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany

[2] Cyprus Univ Technol, Dept Commerce Finance & Shipping, Limassol, Cyprus

[3] Univ Surrey, Surrey Business Sch, Guildford GU2 7XH, Surrey, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2019年 / 54卷

关键词：

FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; INVESTMENT; GOVERNANCE; RISK;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Cash holding is on average more valuable when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Economically, having an overconfident CEO on board is associated with an increase of $0.28 in the value of $1.00 cash holding. The positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash concentrates among firms that are more likely to suffer from the underinvestment problem (i.e., financially constrained firms which exhibit high growth opportunities). In addition, CEO overconfidence affects negatively the value of cash in firms that are financially unconstrained, a finding which is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. The results are robust to various tests and alternative explanations.

引用

页码：85 / 106

页数：22

共 41 条

[1] Cash Holdings and Credit Risk [J].