Insecure property rights and the housing market: Explaining India?s housing vacancy paradox

被引:11
作者
Gandhi, Sahil [1 ]
Green, Richard K. [2 ]
Patranabis, Shaonlee [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Manchester, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90007 USA
[3] London Sch Econ, London, England
关键词
Vacant Housing; Housing Markets; Property Rights; Rent Control; India; RENT CONTROL; LIABILITY RULES; VARIABLES; SLUMS; LEARN; VIEW;
D O I
10.1016/j.jue.2022.103490
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A B S T R A C T One housing paradox in many markets is the simultaneous presence of high costs and high vacancy rates. India has expensive housing relative to incomes and an urban housing vacancy rate of 12.4%. We show how insecure property rights in India, as a result of rent control and weak contract enforcement, increases vacancy rates. Using a two-way linear fixed effects panel regression, we exploit changes in rent control laws in the states of West Bengal, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Maharashtra to find that pro-tenant laws are positively related to vacancy rates. A pro-landlord policy change liberalizing rent adjustments could potentially reduce vacancy rates by 2.8 to 3.1 percentage points. Contract enforcement measured by density of judges is negatively related to vacancy. We estimate that a policy change in rent control laws would have a net welfare benefit and could reduce India???s housing shortage by 7.5%.
引用
收藏
页数:18
相关论文
共 72 条
[1]  
Allen K, 2014, FINANCIAL TIMES 0529
[2]  
Amy K., 2000, Journal of Property Research, V17, P329, DOI [https://doi.org/10.1080/09599910010001448, DOI 10.1080/09599910010001448]
[3]   Weak Instruments in Instrumental Variables Regression: Theory and Practice [J].
Andrews, Isaiah ;
Stock, James H. ;
Sun, Liyang .
ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, VOL 11, 2019, 2019, 11 :727-753
[4]   TIME FOR REVISIONISM ON RENT CONTROL [J].
ARNOTT, R .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1995, 9 (01) :99-120
[5]  
Arnott R., 1988, J REAL ESTATE FINANC, V1, P203
[6]   Housing Supply Dynamics under Rent Control: What Can Evictions Tell Us? [J].
Asquit, Brian J. .
AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, 2019, 109 :393-396
[7]  
Badger E., 2017, The New York Times
[8]   Moving to Opportunity or Isolation? Network Effects of a Randomized Housing Lottery in Urban India [J].
Barnhardt, Sharon ;
Field, Erica ;
Pande, Rohini .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2017, 9 (01) :1-32
[9]   Property rights and liability rules: The ex ante view of the Cathedral [J].
Bebchuk, LA .
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 2001, 100 (03) :601-639
[10]   Securing Property Rights [J].
Behrer, A. Patrick ;
Glaeser, Edward L. ;
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. ;
Shleifer, Andrei .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2021, 129 (04) :1157-1192