A dynamic perspective on minimum quality standards under Cournot competition

被引：11
作者：
Napel, Stefan [1 ]
Oldehaver, Gunnar [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bayreuth, Dept Econ, D-95440 Bayreuth, Germany
来源：
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 39卷 / 01期
关键词：
Minimal quality standard; Cournot competition; Collusion; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; COLLUSION; DUOPOLY; PRICE;
D O I：
10.1007/s11149-010-9140-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores its possible dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may outweigh the static losses which are caused by regulation's distortive effect on equilibrium qualities.
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页码：29 / 49
页数：21
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