Monitoring: When Institutional Investors Do?

被引：0

作者：

Tang, Songlian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT (ICPEM 2009), VOL 5: STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY | 2009年

关键词：

institutional investor; corporate governance; repeated game;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We use a repeated game model to analysis when the institutional investors take "monitoring" action in corporate governance. The repeated game indicated that the higher percent and longer holding period of institutional, the greater possibility of institutional investors take "monitoring" action. It induce that the stockholding proportion and their holding period of institutional investors depend the cost-benefit framework of their monitoring on game theory. To the best knowledge; this is the first paper to study the role of China's institutional investors in corporate governance, simultaneously, from their stockholding proportion and their holding period.

引用

页码：295 / 298

页数：4

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