Economic Incentives and Global Fisheries Sustainability

被引:57
作者
Costello, Christopher [1 ]
Lynham, John [2 ]
Lester, Sarah E. [3 ]
Gaines, Steven D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Bren Sch Environm Sci & Management, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[2] Univ Hawaii Manoa, Dept Econ, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA
[3] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Inst Marine Sci, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
来源
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESOURCE ECONOMICS, VOL 2, 2010 | 2010年 / 2卷
关键词
catch shares; marine conservation; property rights; ITQs; environmental solutions; INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS; ABDICATING RESPONSIBILITY; BIODIVERSITY LOSS; PROPERTY; RESOURCE; EFFICIENCY; TRAGEDY; IMPACTS; DECEITS; ITQS;
D O I
10.1146/annurev.resource.012809.103923
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Widespread global collapses of fisheries corroborate decades-old predictions by economists, made long before large-scale industrialization of the world's fisheries, that open access would have deleterious ecological and economic effects on fishery resources. Incentive-based alternatives (collectively called catch shares) have been shown to generate pecuniary benefits, but little empirical evidence exists for, or against, a link to global fisheries sustainability. We report and expand on an analysis of >11,000 fisheries worldwide, in which we investigated the causes of fisheries collapse from 1950 to 2003. Using a program evaluation design, we found that catch shares prevent and, in some specifications, reverse fisheries collapse. Subsequent scientific studies reinforce and challenge these findings, suggesting fruitful avenues for future research linking incentive-based resource management to sustainability
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 318
页数:20
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