Exchange and optimality

被引：3

作者：

Ghosal, S

Polemarchakis, HM

机构：

[1] Univ Catholique Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[2] Univ London Queen Mary & Westfield Coll, Dept Econ, London E1 4NS, England

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 1999年 / 13卷 / 03期

关键词：

social states; optimality; exchange;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990050273

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any nontrivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D60, D62.

引用

页码：629 / 642

页数：14

共 16 条

[1]

Arrow K.J., 1951, P 2 BERK S MATH STAT, P507

[2] EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY [J].