Moderating effect of CEO power on institutional ownership and performance

Purpose This study examines the impact of institutional ownership (IO) on firm performance. It also investigates whether powerful CEOs using a "CEO score index" moderate IO and firm performance nexus by drawing on insights from the agency and resource dependency theories. Design/methodology/approach Data were obtained from annual reports of companies listed on the Palestine Security Exchange from 2009 to 2019. Panel data regressions were conducted based on 528 observations. In addition, this study repeated the analysis using a one-step generalized method of moments (GMM) and two-stage least squares analysis to deal with the endogeneity issue. Findings Results show that IO and CEO power is positively associated with firm performance. Besides, it has been established that CEO power strengthens the relationship between IO and performance. Thus, this can be summarized that IO improves firm performance; however, with the powerful CEO intervention, the performance will improve even more. Originality/value Studying IO is timely given since the type of ownership is paramount to identify which form of a high degree of ownership affects the performance negatively, especially, in the Palestine environment which is dominated by institutional investors. This is of great importance to the investors as it will enable them to identify the type of firms to which they can commit their funds, and which firm excels through the CEO power. Besides, the inconsistency results in previous literature on IO, and firm performance indicates that there is an indirect effect that needs alternative explanations.