Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability

被引：6

作者：

Doghmi, Ahmed ^{[1
]}

Ziad, Abderrahmane ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Caen, CNRS, Ctr Rech Econ & Management, UMR 6211, F-14032 Caen, France

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 100卷 / 01期

关键词：

Nash implementation; monotonicity; no veto power; unanimity;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：150 / 152

页数：3

共 14 条

[1] [Anonymous], SOCIAL GOALS SOCIAL
[2] IMPLEMENTATION VIA NASH EQUILIBRIA
DANILOV, V
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1992, 60 (01) : 43 - 56
[3] HURWICZ L, 1986, SOCIAL CHOICE PUBLIC
[4] Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality
Maskin, E
[J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1999, 66 (01) : 23 - 38
[5] GAME FORMS FOR NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES
MCKELVEY, RD
[J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1989, 6 (02) : 139 - 156
[6] NASH IMPLEMENTATION - A FULL CHARACTERIZATION
MOORE, J
REPULLO, R
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (05) : 1083 - 1099
[7] A SIMPLE PROOF OF MASKIN THEOREM ON NASH IMPLEMENTATION
REPULLO, R
[J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1987, 4 (01) : 39 - 41
[8] STRATEGY SPACE REDUCTION IN MASKIN THEOREM - SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR NASH IMPLEMENTATION
SAIJO, T
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (03) : 693 - 700
[9] SJOSTROM T, 1991, SOC CHOICE WELFARE, V8, P333
[10] THOMSON W, 1990, MANIPULATION I UNPUB

← 1 2 →