Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

被引：42

作者：

Shelegia, Sandro ^{[2
]}

Spiegel, Yossi ^{[1
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Recanati Grad Sch Business Adm, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria

[3] Ctr European Econ Res ZEW, Mannheim, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 114卷 / 01期

关键词：

Bertrand oligopoly; Cost asymmetry; Partial cross ownership; CROSS-OWNERSHIP; COLLUSION; ARRANGEMENTS; RIVALS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that the Bertrand oligopoly model with cost asymmetries may admit multiple Nash equilibria when firms hold passive ownership stakes in each other. The equilibrium price may be as high as the monopoly price of the most efficient firm. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：136 / 138

页数：3

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