Power control systems;
time-delay switch attack;
attacks/faults tolerant designs;
intrusion detection;
adaptive communication channel;
cyber attack;
resilient design;
ADAPTIVE RESOURCE-ALLOCATION;
LOAD FREQUENCY CONTROL;
D O I:
10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2731780
中图分类号:
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号:
0812 ;
摘要:
Industrial control systems are distributed hierarchical networks that share information via an assortment of communication protocols. Such systems are vulnerable to attacks that can cause disastrous consequences. This article focuses on time delay switch (TDS) attacks and shows that cryptographic solutions are ineffective in recovering from the denial of service component of IDS attacks. Therefore, a cryptography-free IDS recovery (CF-IDSR) communication protocol enhancement is developed that leverages adaptive channel redundancy techniques and a novel state estimator, to detect and recover from the destabilizing effects of IDS attacks. Simulation results are conducted to prove that CF-IDSR ensures the control stability of linear time invariant systems and to show the efficacy of CF-TDSR against attacks deployed on multi-area load frequency control components of a distributed power grid.