Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions

被引:9
作者
Jacquet, Nicolas L. [1 ,2 ]
Tan, Serene [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Adelaide, Sch Econ, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
[2] Singapore Management Univ, Sch Econ, Singapore S178903, Singapore
[3] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore S117570, Singapore
关键词
Directed search; Contracts; Vacancies; Risk sharing; Competition; IMPLICIT CONTRACTS; UNEMPLOYMENT; EQUILIBRIUM; ASSIGNMENT; EMPLOYMENT; SELECTION; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.014
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a directed search model with risk-averse workers and risk-neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage-vacancy contracts, i.e., contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant, and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants. We establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage-vacancy contracts. We show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a Monotonic Expected Utility property which is efficient. Furthermore, we investigate the role of wage-vacancy contracts on welfare and competition. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1064 / 1104
页数:41
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