Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

被引：1

作者：

Shimoji, Makoto ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN | 2017年 / 21卷 / 04期

关键词：

Discrete private-value auctions; Revenue comparison; Weak dominance; ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS; 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS; WINNERS CURSE; EQUILIBRIUM; UNIQUENESS; DESIGN; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the "virtual" revenue equivalence.

引用

页码：231 / 252

页数：22

共 6 条

[1] Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
Makoto Shimoji
Review of Economic Design, 2017, 21 : 231 - 252
[2] Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Doni, Nicola
Menicucci, Domenico
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2013, 13 (01): : 429 - 461
[3] Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
Tan, Xu
Xing, Yiqing
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2011, 111 (01) : 99 - 103
[4] Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2018, 65 (03) : 781 - 817
[5] Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples
Malueg, David A.
Orzach, Ram
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2009, 105 (02) : 177 - 180
[6] Level-k auctions:: Can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions?
Crawford, Vincent P.
Iriberri, Nagore
ECONOMETRICA, 2007, 75 (06) : 1721 - 1770

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