Subject-sensitive invariantism and the knowledge norm for practical reasoning

被引：134

作者：

Brown, Jessica ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AJ, Fife, Scotland

来源：

NOUS | 2008年 / 42卷 / 02期

基金：

英国艺术与人文研究理事会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：167 / 189

页数：23

共 23 条

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