Sea battle semantics

被引:14
作者
Brogaard, Berit [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, St Louis, MO 63121 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.515.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow', while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later 'become' true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents.
引用
收藏
页码:326 / 335
页数:10
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