Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

被引：11

作者：

Renou, Ludovic ^{[1
]}

Schlag, Karl H. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Leicester, Dept Econ, Leicester LE1 7RH, Leics, England

[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona, Spain

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2011年 / 71卷 / 02期

关键词：

Implementation; Minimax regret; Maskin monotonicity; NASH IMPLEMENTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of epsilon-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in epsilon-minimax regret equilibrium for all epsilon is an element of [0, 1). (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：527 / 533

页数：7

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