The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations

被引：4

作者：

Akin, S. Nuray ^{[1
]}

Platt, Brennan C. ^{[2
]}

Sertel, Murat R. ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Miami, Dept Econ, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA

[2] Brigham Young Univ, Dept Econ, Provo, UT 84602 USA

[3] Bogazici Univ, Dept Econ, Istanbul, Turkey

[4] Bilkent Univ, Dept Econ, Ankara, Turkey

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN | 2011年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

Bargaining; Concession; Pre-donation; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; ENDOWMENTS; MANIPULATION;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre- donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one's utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents' preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.

引用

页码：147 / 162

页数：16