The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations

被引：4
|
作者：
Akin, S. Nuray [1 ]
Platt, Brennan C. [2 ]
Sertel, Murat R. [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Miami, Dept Econ, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
[2] Brigham Young Univ, Dept Econ, Provo, UT 84602 USA
[3] Bogazici Univ, Dept Econ, Istanbul, Turkey
[4] Bilkent Univ, Dept Econ, Ankara, Turkey
来源：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN | 2011年 / 15卷 / 02期
关键词：
Bargaining; Concession; Pre-donation; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; ENDOWMENTS; MANIPULATION;
D O I：
10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre- donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one's utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents' preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.
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页码：147 / 162
页数：16
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