Equity Structure, Strategic Investment Psychology, and Performance in China's Green Economy Context

被引:3
作者
Guo, Li Xin [1 ]
Lin, Kuen-Lin [2 ]
Zhang, Li-Ting [1 ]
Liu, Chi-Fang [2 ]
机构
[1] Huaiyin Inst Technol, Sch Business, Huaian, Peoples R China
[2] Cheng Shiu Univ, Dept Business Adm, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
关键词
equity structure; strategic investment psychology; green economy; largest shareholder; green affair investments; CORPORATE-OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY COSTS; GOVERNANCE; INNOVATION; DECISION; BOARD; US;
D O I
10.3389/fpsyg.2021.707582
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
This study empirically tests the impacts of equity structure on strategic investment psychology in green affairs in R&D vs. Marketing dimensions and company performance. Based on data from Chinese high-tech industry listed companies, the empirical results show that: (1) the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio has a positive effect on marketing investment psychology and a negative impact on R&D investment psychology, (2) other large shareholders' shareholding ratio are positive related to R&D investment psychology; (3) R&D investment psychology has a negative effect and marketing investment psychology has a positive influence on the current performance; (4) equity counterbalance is positive related to R&D investment psychology and has a negative effect on the current performance. This study contributes to the literature of corporate governance on sustainability issue by providing a new psychological perspective. The results also provide an important guidance for the corporate governance practice in green economies.
引用
收藏
页数:12
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