Fee versus royalty reconsidered

被引：93

作者：

Sen, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] SUNY Stony Brook, Dept Econ, Stony Brook, NY 11794 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2005年 / 53卷 / 01期

关键词：

royalty; auction; k-drastic innovation; exact k-drastic innovation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

For an outsider innovator in a Cournot oligopoly, royalty licensing could be superior to both fixed fee and auction. The result depends on a simple fact that has been overlooked in the existing literature, namely, the number of licenses can take only integer values. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：141 / 147

页数：7

共 32 条

[1]

Arrow KJ, 1962, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, P609, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400879762-024

[2] THE LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].