Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?

被引：28

作者：

Brown, Jessica ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AJ, Fife, Scotland

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00432.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：123 / 157

页数：35

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