Labor Market Power

被引：84

作者：

Berger, David ^{[1
]}

Herkenhoff, Kyle ^{[2
,3
]}

Mongey, Simon ^{[2
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA

[2] Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55480 USA

[3] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA

[4] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2022年 / 112卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

EMPLOYER SIZE; COMPETITION; MONOPSONY; INVESTMENT; SHARE; RISE;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.20191521

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms' local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor's share of income between 1977 and 2013.

引用

页码：1147 / 1193

页数：47

共 63 条

[1] International Shocks, Variable Markups, and Domestic Prices [J].