Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method

被引:3
作者
Collins, Andrew J. [1 ]
Etemadidavan, Sheida [1 ]
Khallouli, Wael [1 ]
机构
[1] Old Dominion Univ, Batten Coll Engn & Technol, Dept Engn Management & Syst Engn, 2101 Engn Syst Bldg, Norfolk, VA 23529 USA
关键词
Cooperative game theory; hedonic games; Monte Carlo methods; core partition; core stability; COALITION-FORMATION GAMES; STABILITY;
D O I
10.1142/S0219198922500013
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
Hedonic games have gained popularity over the last two decades, leading to several research articles that have used analytical methods to understand their properties better. In this paper, a Monte Carlo method, a numerical approach, is used instead. Our method includes a technique for representing, and generating, random hedonic games. We were able to create and solve, using core stability, millions of hedonic games with up to 16 players. Empirical distributions of the hedonic games' core sizes were generated, using our results, and analyzed for games of up to 13 players. Results from games of 14-16 players were used to validate our research findings. Our results indicate that core partition size might follow the gamma distribution for games with a large number of players.
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页数:28
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