Out-Of-Equilibrium Bids in First-Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids

被引：18

作者：

Kirchkamp, Oliver

Reiss, J. Philipp ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2011年 / 121卷 / 557期

关键词：

WINNERS CURSE; BIDDING BEHAVIOR; STATED BELIEFS; INFORMATION; GAMES; FEEDBACK; REGRET; MODEL; PLAY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02455.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies (e.g. because of risk aversion, regret, quantal-response mistakes). To distinguish between these two explanations, we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions. We extensively test the internal validity of this setup. We find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk-neutral best reply.

引用

页码：1361 / 1397

页数：37

共 44 条

[41] Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions
Keskin, Kerim
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2016, 20 (01) : 57 - 67
[42] Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
Gentry, Matthew
Li, Tong
Lu, Jingfeng
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2015, 94 : 214 - 221
[43] Out-of-equilibrium scaling behavior arising during round-trip protocols across a quantum first-order transition
Tarantelli, Francesco
Scopa, Stefano
PHYSICAL REVIEW B, 2023, 108 (10)
[44] Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions (Oct, 10.1007/s10614-022-10321-y, 2022)
Fagandini, Paulo
Dierickx, Ingemar
COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2023, 61 (03) : 1037 - 1037

← 1 2 3 4 5 →