Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment

被引:21
作者
Hilbe, Christian [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Hagel, Kristin [4 ]
Milinski, Manfred [4 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria
[4] Max Planck Inst Evolut Biol, Dept Evolutionary Ecol, Plon, Germany
来源
PLOS ONE | 2016年 / 11卷 / 10期
关键词
ITERATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; ZERO-DETERMINANT STRATEGIES; DIRECT RECIPROCITY; HUMAN COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; GENEROSITY; COEVOLUTION; CHOOSINESS; PLAYERS; GAMES;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0163867
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Direct reciprocity is a major mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Several classical studies have suggested that humans should quickly learn to adopt reciprocal strategies to establish mutual cooperation in repeated interactions. On the other hand, the recently discovered theory of ZD strategies has found that subjects who use extortionate strategies are able to exploit and subdue cooperators. Although such extortioners have been predicted to succeed in any population of adaptive opponents, theoretical follow-up studies questioned whether extortion can evolve in reality. However, most of these studies presumed that individuals have similar strategic possibilities and comparable outside options, whereas asymmetries are ubiquitous in real world applications. Here we show with a model and an economic experiment that extortionate strategies readily emerge once subjects differ in their strategic power. Our experiment combines a repeated social dilemma with asymmetric partner choice. In our main treatment there is one randomly chosen group member who is unilaterally allowed to exchange one of the other group members after every ten rounds of the social dilemma. We find that this asymmetric replacement opportunity generally promotes cooperation, but often the resulting payoff distribution reflects the underlying power structure. Almost half of the subjects in a better strategic position turn into extortioners, who quickly proceed to exploit their peers. By adapting their cooperation probabilities consistent with ZD theory, extortioners force their co-players to cooperate without being similarly cooperative themselves. Comparison to non-extortionate players under the same conditions indicates a substantial net gain to extortion. Our results thus highlight how power asymmetries can endanger mutually beneficial interactions, and transform them into exploitative relationships. In particular, our results indicate that the extortionate strategies predicted from ZD theory could play a more prominent role in our daily interactions than previously thought.
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页数:14
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