The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism

被引:69
作者
DeRose, K [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00394.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outlive and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
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页码:172 / 198
页数:27
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