The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism

被引：69

作者：

DeRose, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2005年 / 55卷 / 219期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00394.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outlive and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.

引用

页码：172 / 198

页数：27

共 12 条

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