Do tender offers create value? New methods and evidence

被引:114
作者
Bhagat, S
Dong, M
Hirshleifer, D [1 ]
Noah, R
机构
[1] Cambridge Finance Partners LLC, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
[3] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[4] Univ Colorado, Leeds Sch Business, Boulder, CO 80309 USA
关键词
tender offers; value improvements; truncation dilemma; revelation bias; agency problems;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Conventional techniques of estimating takeover value improvements measure only a fraction of the total gain and include revelation about bidder stand-alone value. To address these biases, we develop the probability scaling method, which rescales announcement date returns; and the intervention method, which uses returns at intervening events. Perceived value improvements are larger than traditional methods indicate. We cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders on average pay fair prices. Combined bidder-target stock returns are higher for hostile offers, lower for equity offers, and lower for diversifying offers. These effects reflect revelation about bidder stand-alone value, not differences in gains from combination. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 60
页数:58
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