Communist Party membership can generate labor market benefits in at least two ways. First, the Party may hand out direct benefits to favored groups in the form of higher earnings. Alternatively, the Party may function in much the same way as education in Western countries, screening workers for talent and motivation. We find very little evidence of earnings premiums to Party membership or to cadre status prior to Chinese market liberalization. With liberalization comes less emphasis on being "red" and a greater capacity to earn wages that reflect ability, both observed through schooling and identified by the Party. We find that Party premiums are inversely related to education. Modest premiums to cadre status appear in 1995.
机构:
George Mason Univ, Mercatus Ctr, 3301 N Fairfax Dr,Ste 450, Arlington, VA 22201 USAGeorge Mason Univ, Mercatus Ctr, 3301 N Fairfax Dr,Ste 450, Arlington, VA 22201 USA
Aligica, Paul Dragos
Tarko, Vlad
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机构:
George Mason Univ, Econ Dept, Mercatus Ctr, 3301 N Fairfax Dr,Ste 450, Arlington, VA 22201 USAGeorge Mason Univ, Mercatus Ctr, 3301 N Fairfax Dr,Ste 450, Arlington, VA 22201 USA
机构:
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, B. I. Moody III College of Business, 214 Hebrard Blvd., Lafayette, LADepartment of Economics and Finance, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, B. I. Moody III College of Business, 214 Hebrard Blvd., Lafayette, LA
机构:
Univ Ljubljana, Fac Adm, Dept Publ Sector Econ & Management, Ljubljana 1000, SloveniaUniv Ljubljana, Fac Adm, Dept Publ Sector Econ & Management, Ljubljana 1000, Slovenia