Game model and analysis of market-based refined safety management in a coal mine enterprise

被引:0
作者
Weng, Yifei [1 ]
机构
[1] North China Inst Sci & Technol, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源
PROGRESS IN MINE SAFETY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING II | 2014年
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TD [矿业工程];
学科分类号
0819 ;
摘要
In this thesis, first of all the concept and basic connotation of market-based refined safety management is described. Then in view of short-term, static game analysis of market-based refined safety management is made, as well as long-term Dynamic game analysis of market-based refined safety management. Finally conclusions can be drawn that, as for the static state in a short-term, the market-based refined safety management will influence the profit of divisions; but from a long-term dynamic state, it is best for the whole benefit of an enterprise.
引用
收藏
页码:615 / 618
页数:4
相关论文
共 2 条
[1]  
Nash John, 2000, ESSAYS GAME THEORY
[2]  
Weng Yifei, 2008, SAFETY ENV PROTECTIO, V35, P78