Random paths to P-stability in the roommate problem

被引：19

作者：

Inarra, E. ^{[1
]}

Larrea, C. ^{[1
]}

Molis, E. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Basque Country, Bilbao 48015, Spain

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2008年 / 36卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

roommate problem; random paths to stability;

D O I：

10.1007/s00182-007-0089-y

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

For solvable roommate problems with strict preferences Diamantoudi et al. (Games Econ Behav 48: 18-28, 2004) show that for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blocking pairs leading to a stable matching. In this paper, we define P-stable matchings associated with stable partitions and, by using a proposal-rejection procedure, generalize the previous result for the entire class of roommate problems.

引用

页码：461 / 471

页数：11

共 15 条

[1] PATHS TO MARRIAGE-STABILITY [J].