R&D investments under endogenous cluster formation

被引：2
作者：
Dawid, Herbert [1 ,2 ]
Hellmann, Tim [3 ]
机构：
[1] Bielefeld Univ, Dept Business Adm & Econ, POB 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany
[2] Bielefeld Univ, Ctr Math Econ, POB 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany
[3] Univ Southampton, Dept Econ, Highfield Campus, Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hants, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2020年 / 174卷
关键词：
R&D; Cluster formation; Oligopoly; RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES; DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION; EFFICIENCY; FIRM; COLLABORATION; EXPENDITURES; CAPABILITIES; TOURNAMENTS; SPILLOVERS; INNOVATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.039
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We provide an innovative theory-based explanation for the positive relationship between firms' R&D intensity and their degree of R&D cooperation. We show that, when oligopolistic firms decide on long-term R&D investment before forming research clusters among competitors, investment incentives are increased by the desire to become a member of an attractive cluster. This can result in over-investment compared to the welfare optimum and compared to a scenario where research clusters are ex-ante fixed. Thereby, as a theoretical contribution, we fully characterize the equilibria of the unanimity game on cluster formation with heterogeneous firms. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：253 / 283
页数：31
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